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THE INDETERMINACY OF THE LAW: 
CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES AND THE 
PROBLEM OF LEGAL EXPLANATION 
Charles M. Yablon* 
A central assertion of the Critical Legal Studies theorists is that 
the law—or more specifically, the relationship between authoritative 
doctrinal materials (like statutes, cases, etc.) and the actions of legal 
decisionmakers—is loose or "indeterminate."' They reject the notion 
that legal doctrine can ever compel determinate results, in a deductive 
sense, in concrete cases. ^  In so doing. Critical theorists seek to asso­
ciate legal indeterminacy with the feeling, familiar to most law stu­
dents and practicing lawyers, that doctrine can be utilized to argue 
any side of any legal issue. ^  
This claim will strike a responsive chord in many practicing law­
yers, particularly litigators, who are used to approaching doctrinal 
materials, not as a coherent guide to permissible conduct, but as an 
arsenal of weapons that can be used to justify virtually any position a 
• Assistant Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law; B.A., 1972, Columbia 
University; J.D., 1975, Yale University. I wish to thank William Bratton, David Carlson, 
Steven Diamond, Arthur Jacobson, David Rudenstine, Katherine Stone, Suzanne Stone, Paul 
Shupack, and David Trubek for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this essay. I am 
also very grateful to Joseph Lamport for providing invaluable research assistance and excellent 
philosophical discussions. 
' See, e.g., Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 57, 101 (1984); Kennedy, 
Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, With Special Reference to 
Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 Md. L. Rev. 563, 580-81 (1982) [here­
inafter cited as Kennedy, Paternalist Motives]; Tushnet, Post-Realist Scholarship, 15 J. Soc'y 
Pub. Tchrs. L. 20, 21 (1980); Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 
561, 570-72 (1983). 
2 See, e.g., Hutchinson & Monahan, Law, Politics, and the Critical Legal Scholars: The 
Unfolding Drama of American Legal Thought, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 199, 206 (1984) ("Legal doc­
trine not only does not, but also cannot, generate determinant results in concrete cases."); 
Kennedy, Paternalist Motives, supra note 1, at 581; see also Heller, Structuralism and Cri­
tique, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 127, 191 (1984) (the contradictory strands of legal theory have only an 
analogical and indeterminate bearing on legal practice). 
3 For example, Roberto Unger observes: 
It will always be possible to find, retrospectively, more or less convincing ways to 
make a set of distinctions, or failures to distinguish, look credible. A common 
experience testifies to this possibility; every thoughtful law student or lawyer has 
had the disquieting sense of being able to argue too well or too easily for too many 
conflicting solutions. 
Unger, supra note 1, at 570. See also Gordon, supra note 1, at 116 (observing that lawyers and 
Judges lay bare the contradictions of the legal system in their adversary arguments and 
dissents). 
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client wishes to maintain.'* The experienced advocate knows that the 
doctrinal regime is sufficiently complex that there will always be some 
set of authoritative materials which, through skillful manipulation of 
the level of specificity and characterization of the facts, he can declare 
to be "controlling" of the case at bar. Similarly, he can be confident 
that no matter what authorities his opponent puts forward as equally 
dispositive, he will be able to find a basis for distinguishing them. 
This is not to imply that by skillfully manipulating doctrine, the advo­
cate feels he is acting in bad faith or distorting the "true" meaning of 
the case. On the contrary, there is sufficient identification between 
lawyer and client, and sufficient indeterminacy in the meaning of the 
doctrinal materials, that most advocates, by the time they finish writ­
ing their briefs, are convinced of the correctness of their clients' 
positions.' 
However, this perception—that every case can be argued both 
ways within the doctrinal system—appears to be inconsistent with an­
other equally familiar phenomenon. Lawyers can, and often do, "de­
termine," in the sense of "predict," the results of concrete cases, and 
they do so largely through an analysis and application of doctrinal 
principles. Every time a lawyer advises a client that one course of 
action entails less legal risk than another, or tells one client she has a 
case while advising another he doesn't, that lawyer is predicting, often 
with a high degree of success, the probable result of a concrete case. 
Indeed, much of what lawyers sell is their ability to predict the re­
sponses of legal institutions based (at least in part) on their ability to 
analyze doctrinal materials.^ 
See Heller, supra note 2, at 186 n.97 (litigation's role in upsetting settled legal practice 
may explain why litigators have been subject to a "certain ostracism . . . within the 
profession"). 
5 See J. Freund, Lawyering 214-15 (1979). As Freund explains; 
[The] hallmark of the effective advocate is his belief in the lightness of his 
cause. . . . 
. . . And before he can set out to persuade others to agree, the first person to 
convince is himself. However skeptically the litigator begins, by the time he's ar­
guing the case in court, his belief is total and absolutely sincere. 
Id. This identification by the advocate with the cause being advocated sometimes resonates 
with religiosity. See, e.g., S. Quindry, Practicing Law 240-41 (1938) (complete fidelity to a 
client's cause and a genuine desire for justice are essential parts of a lawyer's creed, which 
"cause the lawyer to submerge self and exalt the cause he represents"); L.P. Stryker, The Art 
of Advocacy 272 (1954) ("With all my heart I believed that my client had not sinned, but if he 
had, I knew he had a far, far better advocate than 1. If such an advocate would plead for him, 
who was I to decline?"). 
® A substantial body of scholarly literature on "bargaining in the shadow of the law" 
suggests that lawyers and clients consider legal results sufficiently predictable to enable an ex 
ante calculation of the value of claims, thereby fostering an informal settlement. See, e.g., H. 
Ross, Settled Out of Court: The Social Process of Insurance Claims Adjustments 220-22 
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Thus, any coherent analysis of what it means for the law to be 
indeterminate must take into account both the practicing lawyer's in­
tuition that every case can be argued both ways and the seemingly 
contradictory intuition that legal results are predictable or, as ex­
pressed by Cardozo, that in 90% of all cases judicial results can be 
anticipated by "right-minded men.'" 
The obvious compromise position, which many mainstream 
scholars adopt, is to postulate a core of "easy cases" that are "predict­
able," surrounded by a penumbra of "hard cases" where doctrine is 
indeed indeterminate and outcomes are therefore unpredictable.® 
Such a position reduces the claim of legal indeterminacy to a quasi-
empirical matter of degree. Moreover, it does not capture the sense, 
which lawyers often have, that the same case may be both indetermi­
nate and predictable at the same time. It is generally quite easy for 
lawyers to generate an argument that makes perfect "sense" within 
the existing doctrinal structure, but which one can predict, with vir­
tual certainty, will not be adopted by any real judge.' 
The Critical claim that the law is indeterminate need not, and 
should not be viewed merely as a dispute about the extent to which 
law is predictable. Indeed, such a claim need not at all deny the exist­
ence of predictive, or even causal relationships between legal doctrine 
and concrete legal results. Rather, the Critical claim of legal indeter­
minacy may be understood as a declaration that doctrine can never be 
(1970); Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (And 
Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. Rev. 
4, 32 (1983) (The small fraction of all disputes adjudicated "provides a background of norms 
and procedures against which negotiation . . . takes place."); Mnookin & Komhauser, Bar­
gaining in the Shadow of the Law; The Case of Divorce, 88 Yale L.J. 950, 968-69 (1979) 
(suggesting that the legal rules of family law "give each parent certain claims based on what 
each would get if the case went to trial"). 
'' Cardozo's actual point is slightly different as he sought to identify the basis for judge-
made law in the absence of binding precedent. The full quotation is: "The feeling is that nine 
times out of ten, if not oftener, the conduct of right-minded men would not have been different 
if the rule embodied in the [judge's] decision had been announced by statute in advance." B. 
Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 143 (1921). Although implicit in this statement is 
an assumption about the predictability of judicial decisions, it is worth noting that it derives 
from the intuitions of "right-minded men" and not doctrinal rules. 
8 See Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1057, 1060 (1975) ("But if the case at hand 
is a hard case, when no settled rule dictates a decision either way, then it might seem that a 
proper decision could be generated by either policy or principle."). But see Heller, supra note 
2, at 173-74 n.81. 
' See Deutsch, Perlman v. Feldmann: A Case Study in Contemporary Corporate Legal 
History, 8 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 1 (1974) (distinguishing Perlman v. Feldmann from Vietnam-era 
corporate law cases on the basis of the distinction between justifiable and nonjustifiable wars); 
see also Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 Yale L.J. 1, 22-23 
(1984) (setting forth an argument that the fourteenth amendment requires socialism). 
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an adequate explanation of legal results—a claim with profound im­
plications, particularly with respect to legal scholarship. 
This Article suggests that the problem of legal explanation re­
vealed by the Critical theorists can be understood as a particular man­
ifestation of the general problem of historical explanation and that 
work by philosophers of history can be useful in analyzing this prob­
lem. It argues that the inadequacy of doctrinal explanation leads to 
the emphasis in Critical theory on the motivations of decisionmakers 
and the explanation of legal results in terms of underlying social and 
political structures. Moreover, these Critical assertions about legal 
explanation are generally not subject to proof or refutation in an em­
pirical sense, but are established to the extent that they have altered 
the questions legal scholars feel compelled to answer about the law. 
This Article sets forth and defends the preceding claims through 
a philosophical account of the Critical concept of legal indeterminacy. 
It does not seek to analyze or review the written work of any particu­
lar theorist, far less, to give a coherent and exhaustive picture of 
something called "Critical Legal Theory." The impossibility of pro­
viding such an account has already been noted by people more capa­
ble of accomplishing that task.'° Rather, by focusing on and 
analyzing the concepts of indeterminacy, causation, and explanation, 
this Article tries to make explicit what I believe is implicit in much of 
the writing of Critical theorists. Its goal, then, is to set forth a philo­
sophically defensible account of what it means for the law to be inde­
terminate which comports with some, but certainly not all, of the 
main aspects of Critical theory." 
Part I of this Article makes some preliminary distinctions be­
tween prediction and causation and seeks to show how the law can be 
indeterminate and predictable at the same time. Part II analyzes the 
problem of legal explanation as a subset of historical explanation and 
sets forth what I take to be the Critical position that doctrinal expla­
nations of law are never adequate. Part III shows how the Critical 
10 See Linger, supra note 1, at 563-64 n. 1; see also Heller, supra note 2, at 128 n.4 (sug­
gesting a structuralist explanation for the Critical scholars' denial of a group ideology because 
"the privilege of ideological coherence is . . . ironically conferred in the gaze of others"). 
11 The subject of this Article is the indeterminacy critique, not the Critical Legal Studies 
movement itself. It does not deal, except in tangential ways, with transformative politics or the 
relationship of that critique with the development of a left political agenda—issues which may 
be of central importance to the Critical Legal Studies movement. See, e.g., Hutchinson & 
Monahan, supra note 2, at 213. Moreover, this Article is unapologetically "rationalist" in that 
it presumes the value of rational discourse and clarity of terms in achieving common under­
standing, although the concept of rationality has been criticized by some as part of the "ration­
alist, formulaic, positivist, yuk program." Gabel & Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 36 Stan. L. 
Rev. 1, 4-5 (1984). 
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concern with legal explanation leads to concerns about motivation 
and explanation through social and political structures of thought. 
Part IV looks at the epistemological status of the Critical claim that 
the law is indeterminate and demonstrates that, while it is not subject 
to empirical verification, that claim is, in a sense, already established. 
I. DETERMINACY, PREDICTION, AND CAUSATION 
A. Determinacy as Prediction 
The existence, in some cases, of doctrinally predictable results 
does not imply the existence of any causal or necessary relationship 
between legal doctrine and concrete results. The existence of X may 
be a valid predictor of the existence of Y, yet this does not imply that 
X is a necessary condition of Y in either a logical or empirical sense. 
For example, it is likely that the total rainfall for the United States 
does not vary much from year to year. If so, the total rainfall for 1984 
can be used to predict the amount of rain that will fall in 1985. Yet it 
would be absurd to claim that the 1984 total caused the 1985 rainfall 
or that the 1984 total was a necessary condition for the amount that 
fell in 1985. 
Similarly, Critical theorists might argue it would be quite sur­
prising if doctrinal materials (which consist, after all, largely of results 
reached by legal decisionmakers in prior disputes) were not useful in 
predicting how future decisionmakers, who are likely to be either the 
same individuals or similar types of people, will react to similar dis­
putes in the future. But this in no way implies that there is any neces­
sary relationship between the doctrinal formulations contained in 
those materials and the results of concrete cases. 
Indeed, I suspect that lawyers who use doctrinal materials to pre­
dict results in concrete cases read and evaluate them in very different 
ways from students or scholars seeking to derive "correct" doctrinal 
formulations. For example, we are taught that there is a hierarchy of 
doctrinal authority in which Supreme Court cases come first, courts 
of appeals cases second, and so on. In trying to predict a federal dis­
trict court decision, however, my own hierarchy would probably be: 
recent decisions by that district court judge, first; recent decisions of 
the court of appeals likely to review the case, second; recent decisions 
of other district court judges my judge is likely to know, third; and 
Supreme Court decisions, perhaps fourth. 
This point is similar to William Dray's distinction between X as a reliable inductive sign 
of Y, and X as the explanation of Y. See W. Dray, Laws and Explanation in History 61 
(1979). 
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This distinction between prediction and causation leads to the 
observation that there is no necessary connection between the formal 
realizability of a set of legal rules and the predictability of legal re­
sults. This observation, while hardly new,'^ is often obscured or ig­
nored in much current scholarship where one finds an assumption 
that a more formal, clear or consistent set of legal rules automatically 
leads to greater "certainty" of result—that is, greater predictability.'* 
In fact, as we have seen, there is no necessary connection between the 
formal realizability of a set of legal rules and the predictability of re­
sults. As Cardozo noted, a group of "right thinking men" with no 
statutes (or established doctrinal rules) may still be able to predict the 
results of equally "right thinking" jurists most of the time." More­
over, as a practical matter, if we live in a legal regime which is both 
formally indeterminate (since doctrinal arguments can always be in­
voked on both sides) and predictable, no assumptions can be made as 
to whether adoption of more or less formal legal rules will lead to 
more or less certainty of prediction in such a legal regime.'® 
B. Determinacy as Causation 
Once it is recognized that predictive statements about legal re-
'3 For example, in the first quarter of the twentieth century, John Dewey observed: 
Enormous confusion has resulted, however, from confusion of theoretical certainty 
and practical certainty. There is a wide gap separating the reasonable proposition 
that judicial decisions should possess the maximum possible regularity in order to 
enable persons in planning their conduct to foresee the legal import of their acts, 
and the absurd because impossible proposition that every decision should flow 
with formal logical necessity from antecedently known premises. 
Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 Cornell L.Q. 17, 25 (1924). 
See, e.g., Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 Yale L.J. 
1354, 1376 (1978) (proposing a new classification for analyzing corporate freezeouts in the 
expectation of a "material improvement both in the outcomes of litigated cases and in the 
capacity of company managers ... to forestall litigation"); Yablon, Contention Disclosure 
and Corporate Takeovers, 6 Cardozo L. Rev. 429, 459-61 (1985) (suggesting four factors that 
should be considered by a court evaluating corporate disclosure standards, for the purpose of 
providing "a structure in which courts and lawyers can analyze the relevant considerations," 
id. at 461). The point, of course, is not that greater formal realizability will never lead to 
greater predictability, but rather that the correlation can never be simply assumed. For a 
discussion of how an increase in formal realizability leads to less predictability in welfare cases, 
see Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class in the Welfare System, 92 Yale L.J. 1198, 
1221-22 (1983). 
'' See supra note 7. 
See Shupack, Rules and Standards in Kennedy's Form and Substance, 6 Cardozo L. 
Rev. 947, 961-62 (1985) (systemic or general formally realizable rules can introduce standard­
like concepts into legal analysis that increase the opportunities for judicial discretion and 
thereby decrease predictability). Certainly, no assumption can be made without knowing a 
great deal about those who will be applying the rules and those to whom the rules will be 
applied. See Simon, supra note 14, at 1226. 
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suits can be made without necessarily believing that such results are 
caused by the existence of clear and knowable existing rules, a ques­
tion arises: What is it that Critical theorists are denying when they 
deny any determinate relationship between doctrinal rules and legal 
results? Since Hume, it has generally been understood that the asser­
tion of a causal relationship between two events or conditions does 
not imply any logical necessity or the existence of any unobserved 
power in the first event to bring about the latter; rather, that state­
ment asserts an invariable conjunction between the occurrence of the 
first and second event.'' To assert that X is the cause of Y is to assert 
that X is invariably followed by Y, or, stated another way, X is the set 
of all necessary and sufficient conditions for the occurrence of Y.'® 
In practice, this concept of causation, which Mill refers to as the 
"philosophical" concept of causation," is primarily applied in the ex­
perimental sciences. There, events can be sufficiently controlled and 
generalized so as to create a limited and manipulable set of such con­
ditions. For example, the statement "the volume of a gas is deter­
mined by its temperature and pressure" uses "determined" in this 
rigorous sense of philosophical causation. 
However, when this concept of causation is applied to particular-
" D. Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding 61-81 (1927). Hume de­
fined cause as objects in succession of one another, where objects similar to the first object are 
invariably followed by objects similar to the second object. Id. at 79. 
1 J.S. Mill, System of Logic, bk. Ill, ch. V, §§ 1-5 (6th ed. London 1865) (1st ed. 
London 1843). A cause, in Mill's view, "is the sum total of the conditions . . . the whole of 
the contingencies of every description, which being realized, the consequent invariably fol­
lows." Id. § 3, at 372. Mill did not restrict his discussion of causation to discrete, isolatable 
phenomena. The prototypical event in Hume's causal analysis is the collision of billiard balls: 
one event invariably follows another. See D. Hume, supra note 17, at 28. But Mill acknowl­
edged that in the real world only quite rarely is there a single antecedent cause for a given 
event. More often events in nature are the result of complicated clusters of events, including 
both positive and negative conditions. J.S. Mill, supra § 3, at 367-71. 
This redefinition of causality has led some commentators to suggest that Mill embraced 
the doctrine of the plurality of causes. See H.L.A. Hart & A.M. Honore, Causation in the Law 
17-20 (1959). For Mill, any given event may be caused by several conditions and, therefore, 
these conditions must be sufficient to cause the event. However, they are not the necessary 
cause of the event, in the sense of being the exclusive cause. See id. at 18. 
" 1 J.S. Mill, supra note 18, § 3. Mill's rigorous philosophical definition of cause requires 
identification of all "conditions, positive and negative taken together." Id. at 372. But Mill 
distinguished this rigorous definition of cause from the common usage of the word which 
typically identifies a single event as the cause. The common usage, according to Mill, is im­
proper for scientific discourse. Id. at 370. See also R. Collingwood, Essay on Metaphysics 
285-327 (1972), in which Collingwood identified three senses of the word cause: the first asso­
ciated with historical or common usage, admits of a possible multiplicity of causes; the second, 
associated with the practical sciences, identifies a single cause against a background of mani­
fold, necessary conditions; and the third, associated with the pure sciences, corresponds with 
Mill's philosophically rigorous, unconditioned cause that encompasses all background condi­
tions. Id. at 301-02. 
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ized historical events, such as the making of a judicial ruling, it ceases 
to be useful as a practical matter, and perhaps even as a theoretical 
one. If, to state the "cause" of a judicial ruling, one must delineate all 
the necessary and sufficient conditions leading to that ruling, the im­
possibility of the undertaking is obvious. While the existence and ap­
prehension by the judge of various doctrinal materials might well be 
one of the background conditions of the ruling, there are numerous 
others including the identity of the judge, her personality, her legal 
training, her law clerk, the lawyers, their preparation, their training, 
on ad infinitum. 
Even if one agrees that doctrine may be one of the numerous 
background conditions involved in "causing" a judicial result, the 
very complexity of the decisionmaking process ensures that there can 
never be any necessary connection between a particular doctrinal de­
velopment and a concrete act of judicial decisionmaking. This is what 
the Critical theorists mean when they speak of the "contingency" of 
the relationship between doctrine and results.^" Given the large 
number of potentially applicable doctrinal formulations (every case 
can be argued at least two ways) and the large number of other back­
ground conditions. Critical theorists can confidently take the strong 
position that there can never be a necessary connection between any 
doctrinal formulation and a given result.^' In every case, if the other 
background conditions were sufficiently different, a different result 
would apply.^^ 
20 See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 1, at 101 ("The causal relations between changes in legal 
and social forms are likewise radically underdetermined: Comparable social conditions . . . 
have generated contrary legal responses, and comparable legal forms have produced contrary 
social effects."); Hutchinson & Monahan, supra note 2, at 206 ("Legal doctrine is nothing 
more than a sophisticated vocabulary and repertoire of manipulative techniques for catego­
rizing, describing, organizing, and comparing; it is not a methodology for reaching substantive 
outcomes."). 
21 On one level, indeterminacy is manifest in legal doctrine as evidenced by contradictory 
impulses within supposedly coherent doctrine. See supra text accompanying notes 1-5. On 
another level, it has been argued, indeterminacy is emb^ded in language itself, or in the struc­
ture of thought underlying language. See Boyle, The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory 
and Local Social Thought, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 685, 695 (1985), in which the author states: 
There is no objective translation of social phenomena to legal phenomena, no neu­
tral interpretation of unambiguous doctrine. At each stage of the legal process a 
subjective and essentially political act of interpretation is required. This political 
choice is involved in the wording of rules, in the construction and maintenance of 
t h e  " l e g a l  w o r l d "  . . . .  
22 This is the point Robert Gordon makes: 
The Critical claim of indeterminacy is simply that none of these regularities are 
necessary consequences of the adoption of a given regime of rules. The rule-system 
could also have generated a different set of stabilizing conventions leading to ex­
actly the opposite results and may, upon a shift in the direction of political winds, 
switch to those opposing conventions at any time. 
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According to this view, the assertion that law is indeterminate 
reduces to the claim that the relation of legal doctrine to results is 
extremely complex and probably never fully understood. While this 
is a view many Critical theorists hold, such an observation does not 
appear particularly disturbing to any lawyer or legal scholar who has 
spent time studying or practicing in a given field of law. The full 
implications of this view only appear in connection with the problem 
of explaining the actions of judges or other legal decisionmalcers, an 
activity in which many legal scholars purp>ort to be engaged. 
II. INDETERMINACY AND THE PROBLEM OF EXPLANATION 
A. The Problem of Historical Explanation 
Explanation, in its most rigorous form, involves a statement 
about the event sought to be explained and the assertion of a causal 
(that is, invariable) generalization that if an event of the first type 
occurs, an event of the second type will also occur. For example, one 
can "explain" why the lake froze on December 30 by stating that: 
(1) the lake contained 10,000 gallons of water; and (2) the tempera­
ture had been below 25'F for five days. Implicit in this explanation is 
the causal generalization: If 10,000 gallons of water are subjected to 
temperatures below 25°F for five days, that volume of water will 
freeze. Note that this causal generalization is of Mill's philosophical 
type in that it sets forth the necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
freezing of the lake.^^ 
Most explanations of historical events, however, set forth only a 
small fraction of the background conditions that "caused" the event 
in Mill's philosophical sense of causation. For example, one might 
explain Ronald Reagan's election in 1980 by referring to a host of 
events—the Iranian hostage situation, low voter turnout, a conserva­
tive trend among the electorate—none of which were sufficient, in 
themselves, to cause the election of Reagan, but all of which consti­
tuted background conditions required for his election to occur in the 
way it did. At the same time, however, one would probably ignore a 
whole series of other conditions which, while equally necessary, in 
that they were required to exist in order for Reagan's election to oc­
cur, would not be considered very illuminating as explanations of that 
Gordon, supra note 1, at 125. 
According to Ernest Nagel, one characteristic of causal laws found in modem physical 
sciences is that such laws assert "a relation of functional dependence . . . between two or more 
variable magnitudes associated with stated properties or processes." E. Nagel, The Structure 
of Science 77 (1961). The relation of functional dependence between temperature and quantity 
of water is one example. 
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event: that the United States is a democracy, that the Republican 
party exists, that California is a state. 
Thus, the problem of explanation with respect to complex histor­
ical events is that they are "overdetermined":^'* there are a multitude 
of events and conditions which jointly constitute the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for the occurrence of that event, and no identifi­
able principle exists for selecting one or more of those conditions as a 
more valid "explanation" of the event than any other. 
Nevertheless, in a historical or common sense usage of the con­
cept of explanation, it is clear that some background conditions are 
"better" explanations of the event than others. For example, consider 
the person, asked to explain the occurrence of a fire in a nearby build­
ing, who replies that it occurred because there was oxygen in the air at 
the time. Certainly the explanation is true in the sense that the pres­
ence of oxygen was a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for 
the occurrence of a fire. This statement, however, would not gener­
ally be considered a "good" or "adequate" explanation of the occur­
rence of a particular fire. By contrast, the statement "a man in the 
apartment building had been smoking in bed" would likely be consid­
ered an adequate explanation. 
A number of philosophers have attempted to develop some prin­
ciple whereby explanatory conditions (often referred to, in this more 
limited sense, as "causes") can be distinguished from mere back­
ground conditions. Collingwood suggested that, as a matter of "prac­
tical science," the distinguishing feature of explanatory conditions 
was that they could be manipulated or used to obtain or prevent the 
explained effect.^' For example, the explanation that my car is not 
moving because sufficient energy is not being imparted to the rear 
See Gordon, supra note 1, at 70-71. Gordon uses different terminology to make a simi­
lar point. Critical scholarship, according to Gordon, attacks the assumption that social events 
are "determined by impersonal social forces." Id. at 70. Instead, Gordon views social events 
as overdetermined in the sense that "they are processes whose logic is one of multiplicity, not 
uniformity of forms." Id. at 71. 
25 R. Collingwood, supra note 19, at 302-11. Collingwood formulated two principles from 
his critique of Mill's discussion of causation. First, he argued, "for any given person the cause 
. . . of a given thing is that one of its conditions which he is able to produce or prevent." Id. 
at 304. This principle, rephrased as the relativity of causes, leads to the identification of multi­
ple causes in the analysis of a common phenomenon. Collingwood put forward the example of 
a car skid, which by this principle, can be said to be caused by the car's speed, the road's grade, 
or the car's design, depending upon the analyst's vantage point and which factor is most under 
the analyst's control. Id. As a corollary to this principle, Collingwood proposed that "for a 
person who is not able to produce or prevent any of its conditions a given event has no cause 
... at all." Id. at 306. See also Collingwood, On the So-Called Idea of Causation, in 38 Proc. 
Aristotelian Soc'y 85, 85-90 (1938) (defining cause, in one sense, as the power to produce or 
prevent an event at will). 
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wheels to overcome inertial forces, while implying a true causal gener­
alization, is unsatisfactory. The explanation that my car is not mov­
ing because the battery is dead is much better. 
Hart and Honore criticized this method of distinguishing explan­
atory causes, pointing out that, according to it, we could not know the 
cause of cancer, in this explanatory sense, if we could not prevent it." 
They proposed instead a distinction between normal and abnormal 
conditions, arguing that what distinguished the explanatory condition 
was that it was unusual or out of the ordinary. For this reason, smok­
ing in bed, since it constitutes a relatively unusual event, can be the 
explanation for a fire, while the presence of oxygen cannot.^' 
These philosophers also give special attention to the causal expla­
nation of voluntary human acts. For Collingwood, all causal thinking 
is built upon an anthropomorphic metaphor that refers to the experi­
ence of compulsion in human affairs.^® Causation or compulsion in 
human affairs, though, does not negate the idea of free will." Rather, 
the explanatory cause of a voluntary action is the event that provides 
an inducement or persuasion to that actor.^° Hart and Honore use 
similar language to describe a causal connection between two human 
actors. In order to preserve the concept of free will. Hart and Honore 
stress that such causal statements do not imply any generalizable reg­
ularity between reasons and voluntary acts.^' Instead, causal state-
26 H.L.A. Hart & A.M. Honore, supra note 18, at 31. They further noted: "The discovery 
of the cause of cancer would still be the discovery of the cause, even if it were useless for the 
cure or avoidance of the disease. . . ." Id. at 34. Compare Collingwood s definition of cause, 
supra note 25 and accompanying text. Hart and Honore conceded that there was much over­
lap between their definition and Collingwood's; "What very often brings 'controllability' and 
cause together is the fact that our motive in looking for the abnormality which 'makes the 
difference' is most often the wish to control it and, through it, its sequel." Id. Hart and 
Honore's definition is broader than Collingwood's, then, because it includes, within the cate­
gory of causes, such uncontrollable events as droughts and lightning bolts. Id. 
22 Id. at 31-36. But when oxygen is not normally present, as in a laboratory with a con­
trolled atmosphere, the presence of oxygen can serve as the causal explanation of a fire. Id. at 
33. 
28 See R. Collingwood, supra note 19, at 296-327. Causal thinking, in the first sense of the 
word, describes the causes of voluntary human actions. Id. at 296. The second sense of the 
word cause, as«v^'atw1 with the practical sciences, involves the idea of compulsion, which, 
according to Collingwood, is based upon the experience of compulsion in man's social life. Id. 
at 309. Thus, causal thinking in the practical sciences, which describes man's manipulation of 
nature, resembles causal thinking about purely human actions. Id. at 310-11. Collingwood 
claimed that even the third, purely scientific sense of cause is also based on the idea of compul­
sion in human affairs. Id. at 322. 
29 Id. at 293. Indeed, Collingwood indicated that causal thinking depends upon a belief in 
free will: "The act so caused [in the first sense of the word] is still an act; it could not be done 
(and therefore could not be caused) unless the agent did it of his own free will." Id. 
30 Id. at 292-95. 
31 H.L.A. Hart & A.M. Honore, supra note 18, at 52 ("The statement that one person did 
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ments, in their view, describe particularized "mental acts."^^ 
Yet the problem of overdetermination—that is, the existence of a 
multitude of true and .necessary conditions for the occurrence of an 
act—is present with voluntary acts, as well as other events. For ex­
ample, my voluntary act of coming to school today may be explained 
by the statements: "I came because I had a class today"; "I came 
because I am a responsible person"; or "I came because I have recov­
ered from the flu." All are true statements. All constitute reasons for 
the same voluntary action. Indeed, in a rigorous sense, my action 
may only be explained by the sum total of all such reasons. Yet some 
of those individual reasons would be considered more adequate expla­
nations than others. If the concept of a voluntary, choosing subject is 
jettisoned, even more explanations become possible. Rather than ex­
plaining my being at school as a result of my individual action, it then 
becomes possible to analyze the concept of school and show that it is 
dependent upon people like me being there. 
One of the features of explanatory statements, which the preced­
ing discussion illustrates, is that their adequacy depends, to a consid­
erable extent, on the knowledge and assumptions of the person 
seeking the explanation. Both Collingwood's "practical science" 
view, which expressly relies on the questioner's ability to recreate or 
prevent the effect,^'^ and Hart and Honore's normal/abnormal distinc­
tion presuppose that explanatory causes may be different for different 
questioners. Collingwood calls this the "relativity of causes."^' Hart 
something because, for example, another threatened him, carries no implication or covert as­
sertion that if the circumstances were repeated the same action would follow.") 
32 Id. at 48-53. They explain: "One person can only be 'induced' to act by another if he 
knows and understands what that other has said. In this sense the relationship between the 
two actions in such cases is 'through the mind' of the second person." Id. at SO. 
33 A common feature of structuralist analysis is a rejection of subjective consciousness as 
an analytic category. See P. Petit, The Concept of Structuralism: A Critical Analysis 69 
(1977) (suggesting that a common theme in the works of Althusser, Foucault, Lacan, and 
Levi-Strauss is that "the conditions determine subjective consciousness to the extent that [it is] 
self-understanding . . . presenting] subjective consciousness as 'false consciousness', a con­
sciousness systematically beset by illusion about its own autonomy"); see also Heller, supra 
note 2, at 148-51 ("The subject is denaturalized because it recognizes its own mediation 
through structure. It rejects the sense that it has an ontologically given existence, perceiving 
itself instead as a social artifact with a discursively given constitution." Id. at 148); D. Trubek, 
TAKING RIGHTS LIGHTLY?: Radical Voices in American Legal Theory 21 (unpublished 
manuscript based on remarks made at The New School for Social Research & Benjamin N. 
Cardozo School of Law Lecture in Law and Social Theory, Nov. 19, 1984) (available in Benja­
min N. Cardozo School of Law Library) ("There are, in fact, no such things as 'individuals' in 
the liberal sense, since all of us are constructed by the institutions we are engaged in and by the 
language we speak."). 
3* R. Collingwood, supra note 19, at 296-97. 
35 Id. at 304-07. 
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and Honore illustrate it by describing two different explanations of a 
case of indigestion. To the wife of the man with indigestion, the cause 
is the parsnips he ate the night before. To the man's doctor, it is the 
ulcerated condition of his stomach lining. Hart and Honore note that 
it is the questioners' different assumptions about what is normal and 
abnormal that lead to this difference in explanatory causes.^® 
It is not necessary, for purposes of this argument, to decide 
whether either Hart or Collingwo^ have provided a satisfactory cri­
terion for distinguishing explanatory causes from background condi­
tions. Rather, it is simply necessary to note (as they both do) that the 
questioner's own assumptions play a large role in determining the ad­
equacy of any explanatory response. 
Such assumptions may be blatantly instrumental. For example, 
the questioner who wants to know why his car won't go will be satis­
fied only with the explanation which enables him to fix it. Yet this is 
just an example of the broader point—that the adequacy of any ex­
planatory response is determined contextually. Individuals in differ­
ing societal roles will explain the same phenomenon differently. The 
birth of a child with a birth defect may be explained by a doctor as a 
result of chromosome damage, by a lawyer as the result of a negligent 
failure to perform amniocentesis, and by a priest as an act of divine 
will. Thus, the form and adequacy of an explanatory statement is 
dependent on the discipline of which that statement is a part. With 
this in mind, we can reconsider the Critical concept of indeterminacy 
in connection with the problem of legal explanation. 
B. Indeterminacy and the Problem of Legal Explanation 
The problem of explaining legal decisions is a particular instance 
of the general problem of historical explanation. Judicial decisions 
(and, for that matter, all other governmental actions taken pursuant 
to "legal" processes) are historical events and are overdetermined. 
Thus, they may be explained by a set of innumerable background con­
ditions, in the same way as other historical events.'' A potentially 
infinite number of "reasons" exist—that is, a potentially infinite 
number of background conditions can be cited—all of which are nec­
essary for the judge to have taken precisely the action that she did. 
This observation, combined with the Critical insight that doctri­
nal argument can be invoked in support of any judicial result, leads to 
what I believe to be one of the central Critical claims of indetermi-
H.L.A. Hart & A.M. Honore, supra note 18, at 33-34. 
See Gordon, supra note 1, at 75-81. Gordon maintains that "statements of regularity in 
legal-social relations don't stand up very well to historical criticism." Id. at 75. 
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nacy: legal results can never be adequately explained by doctrinal 
materials. 
In this view, it is not a satisfactory explanation of a judge's dis­
missal of a contract action to say she did so "because she applied the 
Parol Evidence Rule." We know (because doctrinal argument can be 
invoked in support of any judicial result) that if the case had not been 
dismissed, it would be possible to explain that result "because the 
agreement was not integrated" or "because the agreement contained 
ambiguous terms." 
None of these proffered reasons are "false" in the sense that they 
had nothing to do with the judge's decision. They may even be the 
"reasons" that floated to the surface of her mind as she wrote the 
opinion. But to the Critical theorists, they are no more adequate than 
the explanation that the fire started because of the presence of oxygen 
in the air. Just as the investigator of a fire knows that he will find 
oxygen at the site, the investigator of judicial decisions knows that he 
will find doctrinal justifications. In neither case does that fact illumi­
nate why this particular judicial event occurred and not some other. 
So far, the argument appears to refute only the most extreme 
kind of formalism. It might be argued that extreme formalists are the 
only ones who would invoke the Parol Evidence Rule to explain the 
dismissal of a contract action. The more sophisticated mainstream 
theorist would explain the invocation of that doctrine by reference to 
the policies and principles that are presumed to underlie it. Thus, a 
standard form of legal explanation these days might well be that the 
contract action was dismissed to encourage careful drafting or to 
avoid potential fraud by requiring contracting parties to set forth the 
entirety of their agreement in a writing. 
Yet the Critical theorists perceive that arguments from principles 
and policies, like doctrinal arguments, are infinitely malleable. In­
deed, they perceive such arguments as merely another form of doctri­
nal justification: one in which every potentially relevant doctrinal 
position has as its epigone a set of policy or principle justifications 
which can be invoked as mechanically in support of any side of the 
argument as can the underlying doctrine.^® 
Thus, the principle of not penalizing contracting parties for the 
drafting failures of their lawyers can be invoked as the counterpolicy 
to the application of the Parol Evidence Rule. The infinite malleabil­
ity of such policies and principles is at least as familiar to most law 
See Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1276, 
1292-93 (1984); Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 
1685, 1722-24, 1731-37 (1976). 
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professors as the manipulation of doctrine is to practicing advocates. 
Indeed, it is not at all unusual anymore to find such policy arguments 
being made directly to judges, as practicing lawyers find that they too 
can be used to argue any side of an issue. 
To the Critical theorists, invocations of such disembodied policy 
formulations to explain concrete decisions are as unsatisfactory as 
doctrinal formulations, because they are equally indeterminate. In­
deed, it is the indeterminacy of such forms of argument which leads 
Unger to lump them with strict doctrinal arguments as simply an­
other version of "formalism."'' 
Thus, implicit in the Critical assertion of legal indeterminacy is 
an attack on the adequacy of legal explanation through doctrine. 
Moreover, by recognizing that such indeterminacy is characteristic, 
not only of strict doctrinal argument, but of policy argument as well, 
a similar attack can be made against policy arguments as inadequate 
to explain legal results. Pointing out the doctrinal or policy bases of a 
decision—like pointing out the presence of oxygen in a room which 
has been set afire—may be an accurate description of a necessary con­
dition, but does not tell us anything we want to know about the event. 
III. EXPLANATION THROUGH MOTIVATION AND 
STRUCTURE OF THOUGHT 
A. Motivation 
If doctrines and policies cannot explain judicial results, what 
can? It is in the attempt to answer this question that some of the 
familiar outlines of Critical theory become apparent. 
Since Critical theorists are well aware that doctrines and policies 
exist to justify any legal result, the decisionmaker's choice of any par­
ticular doctrine becomes the fundamental event that requires explana­
tion. This is true even if the decisionmaker believes herself to be 
constrained by doctrinal rules and does not recognize that she has 
made such a choice at all. If the judge believes herself constrained by 
the Parol Evidence Rule, it is the source of that belief which requires 
explanation. That explanation cannot be provided by the Parol Evi­
dence Rule itself, but may perhaps be provided by an analysis of her 
attitude toward the Rule—her motive in concluding that that rule was 
applicable, and not some other. Thus, the Critical theorists' aware­
ness of legal indeterminacy leads them to seek explanations not in 
doctrines or policies, but in the motivations connected with a particu-
Unger, supra note 1, at 570-73. 
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lar policy or doctrinal choice, and leads to their concern with the rela­
tionship between motivations and legal doctrine. 
Consider then three possible explanations of a result which refer 
to the judge's motivation in applying the Parol Evidence Rule: 
(1) She decided, based on her personal experience and sympa­
thies, that the defendant deserved to win, and she used the Parol 
Evidence Rule as a convenient justification for that previously deter­
mined result; 
(2) She believes that the sole purpose of law is to maximize the 
efficient use of goods and services in society and, after a careful read­
ing of the law and economics theorists, she determined that an unwa­
vering application of the Parol Evidence Rule in all cases would help 
achieve that goal by minimizing ambiguity in contracts, and thereby 
reducing transaction costs; 
(3) She conceives of society as composed of autonomous indi­
viduals acting to benefit themselves at the expense of others, only 
grudgingly seeking mutual benefit by expansion of their obligations to 
each other through contract. Since she perceives most human rela­
tionships—or at least business relationships—as taking this form, she 
believes that the application of a rule that prevents enforcement of 
obligations not expressly delineated in the contract is "right" and 
"appropriate." 
The first explanation assumes that doctrinal materials play no 
part at all in the selection of legal results. The offeror of such an 
explanation agrees with the view that doctrine cannot produce deter­
minate results but goes further and denies the possibility of any rela­
tionship between doctrine and legal results other than a post hoc 
hypocritical one. Such a view locates the motivations of legal deci­
sionmaking solely in the decisionmaker's personal beliefs, prejudices, 
and sympathies. On this view, doctrine is merely a useful method of 
putting a false patina of objectivity on the enactment of judicial 
prejudices and sympathies. 
This view, which may be found in varying degrees among the 
Legal Realists,^ implies that any systematic study of doctrine is likely 
to be of little value. The sources and explanations of judicial value 
choices (if they can be found at all) will be found in the study of how 
^ See, e.g., J. Frank, Law and the Modem Mind 111 (1930), wherein the author states; 
The peculiar traits, disposition, biases and habits of the particular judge will, 
then, often determine what he decides to be the law. In this respect judges do not 
differ from other mortals; Tn every case of actual thinking,' says F.C.S. Schiller, 
'the whole of a man's personality enters into and colors it in every part.' To know 
the judge's hunch-producers which make the law we must know thoroughly that 
complicated congeries we loosely call the judge's personality. 
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judicial sympathies and prejudices are formed—matters on which the 
social sciences may shed light—^but not in the analysis of doctrine.'*' 
The second explanation app>ears to provide precisely the kind of 
determinate explanation of legal results the Critical theorists believe 
cannot be provided by doctrinal or policy justifications. A single and 
universalizable societal goal is posited (i.e., efficiency) which is pre­
sumed to be a necessary and sufficient condition for the choice of any 
particular rule. All that remains is to perform a calculus of rules to 
determine which doctrinal rule, or set thereof, can best achieve that 
goal. Assuming that the persons seeking and providing the explana­
tion share the view (which is assumed, but never demonstrated) that 
efficiency is indeed the only legitimate basis for choosing one doctrinal 
formulation over another, explanations of rule choices as efficiency 
maximizing do indeed "explain" the choice of one rule over another. 
The Critical attack on law and economics is not with respect to 
the theoretical form of such arguments, which purport to provide a 
determinate motivation for rule selection. Rather, the Critical attack 
is based on: (1) the lack of any justification for positing efficiency as 
the sole "metaprinciple" or basis for rule selection; and (2) their dem­
onstration that the efficiency calculus is invariably corrupted by ad 
hoc factual assumptions usually derived from our market economy or 
our particular legal regime.*^ Thus, while law and economics appears 
to provide a determinate model of rule selection that can explain par­
ticular rule choices on the basis of efficiency, any attempt to explain 
particular decisions according to such a model requires reference to 
malleable and unverifiable factual assumptions that quickly render 
such explanations as indeterminate as other forms of policy 
justifications. 
See K. Llewellyn, Jurisprudence: Realism in Theory and Practice 100 (1962) ("I have 
spoken of a new approach [in Legal Realism] to law as a social science, as a matter of behavior 
to be seen, recorded, and studied . . . see also Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the 
Functional Approach, 3S Colum. L. Rev. 809, 822 (1935) (describing Legal Realism's method 
as "an assault upon all dogmas and devices that cannot be translated into terms of actual 
experience"). 
See, e.g., Kennedy, Paternalist Motives, supra note I, at 597-604; Kennedy & 
Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 711, 714 (1980) ("The 
result of this exercise, we believe, is to show convincingly, if nonrigorously, that any argument 
for the economic virtue ('efficiency') of any legal rule must depend on specific assumptions 
about the actual wants and factual circumstances of the persons affected by the choice among 
possible rules . . . ."); see also linger, supra note 1, at 574 ("Asa result, an analytic apparatus 
intended ... to be entirely free of restrictive assumptions about the workings of society and 
entirely subsidiary to an empirical or normative theory that needs independent justification 
gets mistaken for a particular empirical and normative vision."). 
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B. Structures of Thought 
The third explanation—^which I take to be in the form of a Criti­
cal explanation of legal decisionmaking—differs from the first two ex­
planations in that it does not view judicial motivation as separate 
from, and extraneous to, the structure of the doctrinal rule itself. 
Rather, it views judicial motivation as the result of structures of 
thought that are at least partially constituted by the doctrinal rule. 
Accordingly, there is a determinate linkage between the doctrinal rule 
and the mode of social interaction and normative assumptions embod­
ied in the rule. 
This linkage is an outgrowth of the method of Critical theorists, 
who extensively analyze doctrinal material in order to understand the 
structures of thought that underlie the statement and justification of 
legal rules.^^ Any statement of doctrinal rules—indeed, any state­
ment justifying such rules—^must be phrased in language about soci­
ety and the "preexisting" social structure. It may also reflect various 
normative judgments about the social structure. Such background 
structures are implicit in, and needed to "make sense" of, the doctri­
nal rules. 
For example, when Duncan Kennedy asserts that "[t]he rhetoric 
of unequal bargaining power is distributionist in that it asserts the 
desirability of intervention in favor of . . . weaker part[ies] in situa­
tions where there is nothing like common law fraud, duress or inca­
pacity,"^ he is finding, implicit in the language used by judges to 
justify compulsory contract terms, an underlying normative vision of 
the structure of society—a vision in which government may properly 
intervene in favor of those who are relatively weak. 
Such a vision is not merely posited—as efficiency is posited as an 
overarching value by law and economics theorists—^but rather is de­
veloped as an outgrowth of a particular doctrinal rule the Critical 
theorist seeks to explain. In this sense. Critical theory is quite differ­
ent from Legal Realism. It also explains why the Critical theorists, 
despite their assertion that doctrinal argument is indeterminate, con­
sider doctrine worthy of serious study One can find in some Realist 
thought a rejection of any link between doctrine and motives for judi-
43 See, e.g., Casebeer, Teaching An Old Dog Old Tricks: Coppage v. Kansas and At-Will 
Employment Revisited, 6 Cardozo L. Rev. 765 (1985). 
44 Kennedy, Paternalist Motives, supra note 1, at 615. 
43 See Bratton, Manners, Metaprinciples, Metapolitics and Kennedy's Form and Sub­
stance, 6 Cardozo L. Rev. 871 (1985), for a detailed comparison of Critical and more tradi­
tional forms of doctrinal analysis. 
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cial action.^ The Critical theorists believe there is a necessary link 
and, indeed, that important general statements about the nature of the 
legal regime may only be derived from the study of doctrine. 
When the Critical theorist develops such structures of thought 
from the language of doctrinal materi^s, he is not asserting that he 
has found the single and true "cause" of that judicial decision. 
Rather, he is asserting, I believe, that understanding the underlying 
structure of thought is necessary to understand the judicial rule 
choice, in much the same way that calculus is necessary to understand 
physics, or knowledge of Jackson Pollack's work is necessary to un­
derstand that of Roy Lichtenstein."*' 
The Critical theorist would not, I believe, insist that deci­
sionmakers necessarily have such structures "in mind" when making 
rule choices (although that might be the case), but he would insist 
that such structures are implicit in every such rule choice. Thus, the 
judge might not be aware, when she invokes the Parol Evidence Rule, 
that she is instantiating a structure of social thought which views soci­
ety as composed of autonomous individuals acting to maximize their 
personal needs and desires and which views law as desirable only in­
sofar as it permits private ordering between such individuals. In her 
role as judge, she may have no need to refer to her underlying social 
vision at all. Yet, in explaining and justifying her decision, she would 
be likely to agree that this view of human relationships is implicit in, 
and justifies, her choice of rule. The Critical theorist can therefore 
claim—and I believe this is a central claim—that no legal decision can 
be adequately explained without reference to the underlying social 
and normative structures of thought which give meaning to the 
decision.'*® 
^ For example, Jerome Frank reasoned; "If the law consists of the decisions of the judges 
and if those decisions are based on the judge's hunches, then the way in which the judge gets 
his hunches is the key to the judicial process [and wjhatever produces the judge's hunches 
makes the law." Frank, supra note 40, at 104. Frank acknowledged that "rules and principles 
of law are one class of [hunch-producers]," id., and that doctrine helps the judge check up on 
the propriety of his hunches, id. Yet, he believed that legal doctrine plays only a minor role in 
shaping a judge's hunches, in comparison to "hidden factors in the inferences and opinions of 
ordinary men" which are "multitudinous and complicated, depending often on peculiarly indi­
vidual traits of the persons whose inferences and opinions are to be explained." Id. at 105-06. 
A. Danto, The Transfiguration of the Commonplace: A Philosophy of Art 107-11 
(1981). Danto suggested that Roy Lichtenstein's paintings about brushstrokes of the 1960's 
can only be understood in reference to Abstract Impressionism of the 19S0's because they 
"connoted a set of associations only available to those who had known about the dense artistic 
controversies of the 1950's." Id. at 111. 
See, e.g., Trubek, Where the Action Is; Critical Legal Studies and Empiricism, 36 Stan. 
L. Rev. 575, 591-95 (1984). Trubek states; "[T]he consciousness of any society rests on its set 
of world views, on basic (and sometimes implicit) notions about what is natural, necessary. 
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Two decisionmakers who would apply different doctrinal princi­
ples to the same case are, in effect, seeking to instantiate different so­
cial and moral visions.'*' Thus, the claim that law can only be 
adequately explained through such social structures leads to the dec­
laration by Roberto Unger and others that all legal arguments are 
arguments over the nature of political and social activity.'® 
Most of the Critical theorists, however, do not seek to replace the 
search for "true" doctrine with the search for "true" social visions. 
Since such structures are implicit in doctrinal rules, and there are a 
multiplicity of potentially conflicting doctrinal rules, the expanded 
study of doctrine will generate a multitude of conflicting visions of 
human social interaction and the nature of society. Yet by locating 
the level of conflict among such structures—that is, among differing 
visions of the nature of society—the Critical theorists would maintain 
that they have provided a better, more adequate account of the legal 
regime. 
IV. THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL STATUS OF THE 
ASSERTION OF INDETERMINACY 
In the preceding sections I argued that the Critical assertion that 
the law is indeterminate can best be understood as a statement that 
legal results can never be adequately explained by doctrinal rules or 
the principles and policies commonly used to justify such rules. I fur­
ther suggested that this insight leads to a second important Critical 
assertion: legal results can be adequately explained by reference to 
social and political visions implicit in doctrinal rule choices. 
This section will discuss whether these assertions are true or, 
more specifically, the conditions which would determine their truth or 
falsity. I reach the perhaps surprising conclusion that the Critical at­
tack on doctrinal explanation is true largely by virtue of the fact that 
Critical scholars are indeed making such an attack, and thereby ad­
vancing a particular view of the goals of legal explanation. I similarly 
argue that the Critical claim that law can be adequately explained 
just, and desirable." Id. at 592. Thus, he describes legal consciousness as a subset of social 
consciousness—the set of world views that gives meaning to the legal order. He explains: 
"Taken most broadly, legal consciousness includes all the ideas about the nature, function, and 
operation of law held by anyone in society at a given time." Id. 
See, e.g., Kennedy, Paternalist Motives, supra note 1, at 570, 620-21; Klare, Labor Law 
as Ideology; Toward a New Historiography of Collective Bargaining Law, 4 Indus. Rel. L.J. 
450, 451-52 (1981). 
'o Unger states: "The starting point of our argument is the idea that every branch of doc­
trine must rely tacitly if not explicitly upon some picture of the forms of human association 
that are right and realistic in the areas of social life with which it deals." Unger, supra note 1, 
at 570. 
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through underlying social structures of thought also rests on an asser­
tion, albeit a more problematic one, about the goals of legal 
explanation. 
The statements I have taken as central to the Critical position on 
indeterminacy are not statements about the actions of decisionmakers, 
but rather statements about the nature of legal explanations. They are 
statements about the nature of understanding of the law by legal aca­
demics and thus, have a somewhat diflFerent epistemological status 
from either descriptive or normative statements about the law itself. 
One ground for dismissing a class of explanatory statements as 
inadequate is that the regularity asserted by such statements does not, 
in fact, exist. Presumably, the rejection of astrological explanations of 
events is based on the absence of any regularity between the configur­
ation of the stars and the occurrence of events on earth. But explana­
tory statements may assert perfectly valid regularities and yet be 
inadequate as explanations. Statements such as "the fire was caused 
by the presence of oxygen in the air" or "Reagan won the election 
because he was more popular than Carter" are true statements, but 
they are likely to be inadequate as explanations. Adequacy, in this 
sense, is determined as much by the question as the answer. 
Thus, determining the validity of the Critical theorists' claims is 
primarily a matter of evaluating the appropriateness of their questions 
about the legal rules. We have seen that the assertion that a form of 
explanation is inadequate is an expression that it does not provide the 
kind of information expected or provide the kind of understanding 
that is sought by the questioner. Is there any way to evaluate such 
expectations, and judge them appropriate or not? 
Collingwood and Kuhn, writing from very different perspectives, 
have both suggested that such evaluations can be made only within 
the context of a particular "science" or intellectual enterprise. Col­
lingwood suggests that certain types of explanations belong to certain 
types of enterprises. For example, the person who explains my car's 
inability to start by describing the inertial forces acting upon it may 
be an excellent physicist, but a lousy mechanic." He is not asking the 
right question—the question appropriate to a mechanic: "What is the 
condition that I can change that will result in the car's starting?" 
Similarly, the anthropologist who seeks to explain a tribe's ritual sac­
rifice of pigs rather than goats by pointing out that the tribe's gods 
had demanded pigs would not, we could say, be "doing" anthropol­
ogy, but perhaps some sort of comparative theology. In such cases. 
R. Collingwood, supra note 19, at 302-03. 
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the ability to evaluate the adequacy of the explanation for an event 
rests on the purposes of the enterprise in which the parties are 
engaged. 
Kuhn, while not speaking specifically about the problem of 
causal explanation, but about the way scientific enterprise is con­
ducted, locates the source of the scientific enterprise in the shared 
beliefs and values he calls a paradigm. In admittedly circular fash­
ion, he defines "paradigm" as certain shared beliefs and values held 
by the scientific community.'^ He further argues that certain types of 
scientific explanations constitute "exemplars" which form part of the 
shared paradigm of that community. Accordingly, new scientific ex­
planations may be evaluated on the basis of whether or not they re­
semble (that is, refer to) the same type of explanatory causes as those 
explanations which are "exemplars" of the shared paradigm.'^ 
Thus, both Kuhn and Collingwood recognize that an evaluation 
of the adequacy of an explanatory statement can be made only by 
reference to the goals of the discipline within which the explanation is 
proposed. Each discipline provides goals of explanation that are dis­
tinct from the questioner's subjective concerns. Their explanations 
can be evaluated in light of those goals, thereby ameliorating the rela­
tivity of causes. Thus, it is the very existence within a discipline of a 
consensus as to its goals which permits the making of evaluations as 
to the "adequacy" of particular explanations.^' 
This does not mean, of course, that the truth of explanatory 
statements is determined solely by the existence of such a consensus. 
Rather, the recognition that an explanatory statement has been made 
within a discipline enables one to utilize the criteria which exist 
52 See T.S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 176 (2d ed. 1970). 
53 Id. Kuhn's definition of paradigm is circular because, while he defines a paradigm as the 
shared beliefs of a scientific community, at the same time, he defines a scientific community as 
those who share a paradigm. Nonetheless, the idea of paradigm is a core concept in Kuhn's 
work. Id. at 174-87. 
54 An exemplar (or shared example, as Kuhn uses the term) is the type of knowledge em­
bedded in the "concrete problem-solutions" of a scientific discipline. Id. at 187. An exemplar 
includes laboratory, exam, and text book problems that are an integral part of the beginning 
student's daily experience. Kuhn distinguishes between the type of knowledge contained in 
scientific laws and the practical exercise of working through exemplars. Id. at 187-88. 
55 Where a consensus as to the goals of a discipline is lost, an existing paradigm may cease 
to function adequately. The most extreme case in which an older paradigm is replaced by an 
incompatible, new one is that which occurs in a scientific revolution. As Kuhn explains: "Like 
the choice between competing political institutions, that between competing [scientific] para­
digms proves to be a choice between incompatible modes of community life." Id. at 94. For a 
further discussion of the nature and necessity of scientific revolutions and the ways in which 
they change the world view, see generally id. at 92-135. 
1985] INDETERMINACY OF THE LAW 939 
within that discipline for determining the truth of such statements.'® 
But the truth of the causal relationship implied by such statements is 
logically distinct from their status as explanations within a given dis­
cipline. The statement "the American Civil War was caused by Eng­
lish secret agents" is a false statement, but it clearly belongs in the 
genre of historical explanation, rather than that of science or 
mechanics. 
Of course, absolute consensus never exists in any discipline and a 
reevaluation of the purpose of the enterprise is always open. It is at 
this level that the Critical attack on the adequacy of doctrinal expla­
nation carries real weight, because it carries with it certain assertions 
about the nature and goals of the study of law. It asserts that the goal 
of the study of law is to understand the value choices implicit in legal 
decisionmaking. Since doctrinal rules exist to justify any such value 
choice, explaining such value choices as "caus^" by doctrine, or by 
principles or policies underlying the doctrine, can never provide an 
adequate basis for understanding such value choices. 
This claim can only be refuted in one of two ways. One can deny 
the basic claim of indeterminacy, arguing that in some cases, only one 
doctrinal rule is potentially applicable and reference to that rule can 
therefore explain the value choice. We have seen, however, that this 
requires more than merely showing that one can accurately predict 
which of a number of potentially applicable doctrines will be applied. 
Rather, it requires a showing that the contrary result cannot be justi­
fied within the doctrinal system. Here the Critical theorists are in a 
powerful alliance with the practicing bar. The very fact that opposing 
lawyers are invariably able to ask courts or other decisionmakers for 
directly contradictory results and have no trouble finding potentially 
applicable doctrinal rules with which to fill their briefs is strong evi­
dence for the Critical claim that doctrinal rules are indeterminate 
and, therefore, cannot explain value choices. 
The other basis for opposing the Critical scholars' position is to 
attack their view of the goal of legal study. This requires denying that 
the goal of legal study is the examination of societal value choices. If, 
Raymond Aron made a similar point regarding the truth of historical statements. See 
Aron, Relativism in History, in The Philosophy of History in Our Time 158 (H. Meyerhoffed. 
1959). On the one hand, Aron argued that historical selection limits the validity of historical 
argument to those who accept a given "system of reference." Id. However, on the other hand, 
he stated: "[0]nce such a decisive, if not arbitrary, selection has been made, the subsequent 
steps of the historian may well be rigorously scientific and claim to be universally valid." Id. 
Somewhat similarly, Thomas Kuhn discussed how "proponents of competing [scientific] para­
digms will often disagree about the list of problems that any candidate for paradigm must 
resolve." T.S. Kuhn, supra note 51, at 148. 
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for example, the goal of legal study is to predict the results of future 
appellate cases, doctrinal explanation may prove adequate. But, as 
Collingwood and Kuhn have noted, the adequacy of a particular ex­
planatory form must be evaluated within the context of a particular 
intellectual discipline and with specific reference to whether it ad­
vances the goals of that discipline. Such goals, however, are evi­
denced by the shared beliefs and values among those within the 
discipline. Thus, when a substantial group of legal scholars declares 
doctrinal explanation inadequate because it cannot explain the value 
choices made within the legal regime, that declaration is, in a sense, 
self-justifying, since the scholars are declaring that the goal of their 
discipline is the study of value choices, but that these value choices 
cannot be explained by indeterminate doctrine. While the assertion 
that every case can be argued both ways may be challenged as a mat­
ter of fact, the assertion of the goal of legal explanation cannot. The 
very fact that a goal is asserted by those within the discipline makes it, 
in some sense, the goal of legal explanation. 
Of course, it is possible for members of a discipline to disagree 
over its goals. For example, opponents of Critical theory might claim 
that the "true" goal of legal explanation is the prediction or categori­
zation of the actions of appellate judges and not the explanation of 
value choices. But, as Collingwood and Kuhn point out, the only way 
to determine that issue is to look at what those engaged in the study 
consider to be the goals of their discipline. When the consensus splits, 
it may lead to a new consensus arising from debate over the funda­
mental goals of the discipline, or to development of a new discipline. 
In either event, the very existence of the Critical Legal Studies move­
ment establishes, in a sense, its critique of the adequacy of doctrinal 
explanation. 
As to the second central Critical assertion—that law (i.e., the 
rule choices of decisionmakers) can only be adequately explained 
through the political and social values implicit in such rule choices— 
the problem of consensus becomes more acute. Most legal scholars 
are likely to agree that at least one goal of legal study is to explain the 
societal value choices of decisionmakers; yet, we have seen that expla­
nations may take forms other than analyses of the structure of social 
or political visions. One can analyze the social background or psy­
chology of individuals or classes of decisionmakers;'' view law as rit-
" For example, Charles Grove Haines outlined a plan for a general study of the educa­
tional background, family life, legal and political experience, and affiliations of Supreme Court 
justices. Haines, General Observations on the Effects of Personal, Political, and Economic 
Influences in the Decisions of Judges, 17 111. L. Rev. 96, 115-16 (1922). Haines' proposed 
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ual or religion;'® or even, subject to all the caveats about 
methodology, explain value choices on economic grounds." The 
Critical theorist, in my view, does not assert that the implicit social 
and political vision is the sole cause of legal decisions but merely a 
necessary one. Thus, one may ask: What basis, if any, is there for 
rejecting explanations based on other necessary causes? 
I suggest that at this point the problem of legal explanation col­
lapses into the broader problem of historical explanation. Historians 
are faced constantly with the problem of overdetermination.*® Wars, 
for example, may be attributed to the actions of kings and diplomats, 
the operation of economic forces, various forms of class struggle, or 
even demographic and geographic conditions. All of these may con­
stitute valid historical explanations because they are all necessary con­
ditions, without which particular wars would not have occurred as 
they did. Similarly, the legal scholar, while recognizing the explana­
tory power of societal structures of thought, must concede that there 
are also many other conditions that explain why value choices in the 
legal regime occur the way they do. 
Does any basis, then, exist for asserting that such structures form 
a better or more adequate ground for explaining such value choices? 
The notion that such structures of thought are somehow more funda­
mental than other modes of legal or historical explanation is an ap­
pealing one since it can be plausibly argued that such structures 
provide the very "language" within which such concepts as "judge" 
and "law" acquire meaning.®' Yet such a claim is ultimately prob-
study was discussed by Jerome Frank, who observed: "[S]uch investigations might prove of 
immense value if they would stimulate judges to engage in searching self-analysis." Frank, 
supra note 29, at 114. 
'8 For example, Thurmond Arnold wrote: 
The thing which we reverently call "Law" when we are talking about government 
generally, and not predicting the results of particular lawsuits, can only be prop­
erly described as an attitude ... a way of writing about human institutions in 
terms of ideals . . . [that] meets a deep-seated popular demand that government 
i n s t i t u t i o n s  s y m b o l i z e  a  b e a u t i f u l  d r e a m  . . . .  
T.W. Arnold, The Symbols of Government 33 (1935). 
" See, e.g., Calabresi, About Law and Economics: A Letter to Ronald Dworkin, 8 Hofstra 
L. Rev. 553, 558-59 (1980); Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in 
Common Law Adjudication, 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 487, 488 (1980). 
^ For a general discussion of the Critical Legal theorists' interest in history, see Gordon, 
supra note 1, at 57. 
See, e.g.. Heller, supra note 2 at 177. Heller sets forth precisely this claim for the priority 
of a structuralist model, as compared to other models, for explaining legal reasoning. Discuss­
ing various theories of property rights based on sociobiology or Hobbesian philosophy. Heller 
contends: 
I do not believe that any of these accounts [of the origin of property rights] 
can dispel the structural counterclaim that a cultural or linguistic system of dif-
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lematic. If these structures are truly fundamental, both the explana­
tion and the explainer are similarly bound by their conceptual 
categories and can make no special claim for the epistemological su­
periority of this form of explanation." If the legal scholar tries to 
preserve his privileged epistemological perspective by claiming that 
these structures are bound by time and space and therefore may be 
"seen whole" by some observers, the way is open for others to claim 
priority for conditions which explain these structures in terms of indi­
vidual psychology and class interest.^^ 
One way out of this dilemma is to move from a pure structuralist 
position to a form of pragmatism that argues that some explanations 
are more adequate because they are "fuller," within the context of the 
discipline within which they are proposed. That is, they are better 
explanations because they enable the historian to describe more of the 
necessary conditions relevant to the occurrence of a given event. Such 
a justification always involves a reference to the current state of 
knowledge within the discipline. A social historian, for example, may 
justify his explanation of the Puritan Revolution in terms of class con­
flict by claiming that everybody (by which he means other historians) 
already knows who Cromwell was and that the religious aspects of the 
Revolution have already been fully explored. In this view of historical 
explanation, examination of certain types of conditions are better sim­
ply because they identify aspects of the causal background which have 
not been previously examined and which, when added to the existing 
analysis of causes of the Puritan Revolution, lead to a fuller and 
therefore more "accurate" account. Robert Gordon seems to adopt a 
variant of this position when he argues that there is "nothing wrong" 
with a "functionalist" explanation of the enactment of a Wisconsin 
ferentiations constitutes the concrete theory of the subject. However, a liberal so­
cial order must reflect the bifurcated grammar that is expressed in classical 
Western philosophical commitments. The dominant legal discourse must origi­
nate in the twin representations of a knowable, objective . . . world and direct 
subjective . . . apperceptions of norms originating only in individual volition. 
Id. 
Id. at 170-71. The problem could be rephrased in structuralist jargon as the delegitima-
tion of the analyst, or in the more pungent lingo of some Critical scholars, the zapper gets 
zapped. As Heller himself puts it; "One methodological problem within the logic of delegiti-
mation concerns the position of the analyst: How does the analyst step outside his or her own 
conceptual categories to evaluate determining structures, if one's categories themselves were 
formed by these structures?" Id. at 170. These structural constraints on the analyst's percep­
tions are, for Heller, the major problem of poststructuralist knowledge. See id. at 182-97; see 
also Boyle, supra note 21, at 759 (phrasing the problem as a matter of how to distill "exper­
iences that constitute [one] structure from those that contradict it," without making recourse to 
an "infinite regress into meta-principles, meta-meta-principles, and so on"). 
" See e.g., Jacobson, Modem American Jurisprudence and the Problem of Power, 6 Car-
dozo L. Rev. 713 (1985). 
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lien law "as far as it goes."" But he then goes on to show that an 
explanation in terms of the underlying political consciousness of the 
lawmaker provides a fuller explanation of why that law, rather than 
some other, was enacted and thus constitutes a better explanation." 
This justification presupposes that an explanation of value choices is 
part of the goal of the discipline of legal history, and that one explana­
tion of a historical event is better than another if it enables historians 
to set forth more of the historical causes of that event. 
But goals of historical explanation may sometimes involve select­
ing among necessary causes, rather than aggregating them. Histori­
ans sometimes have bitter disputes about causes, even when the causal 
explanations advanced by both sides describe different necessary con­
ditions for the occurrence of the same event. William Dray points out 
an example of such a dispute surrounding the causes of the American 
Civil War." He observes that, while some historians blame the Civil 
War on various acts of individuals, others ascribe it to conflicts over 
issues like slavery and states' rights or to the blunders of contempo­
rary politicians." Dray rightly notes that this type of dispute makes 
no sense if the goal of historical explanation is simply to set forth the 
fullest possible account of all the necessary conditions of the Civil 
War. He argues that in this case, the goal of the historian is to make a 
normative judgment. The debate over what "caused" the Civil War is 
really a debate over who was responsible—that is, who was to 
blame—for the outbreak of the Civil War." 
Legal explanation, even more clearly than historical explanation, 
partakes of this normative character. We "explain" the Parol Evi­
dence Rule in terms which normatively justify it (i.e., "it prevents 
fraud" or "it leads to greater certainty among contracting parties as to 
their obligations"). Such justifications, as we have seen, presuppose 
their own societal and political structures and a set of values inherent 
in such structures. The legal scholar who explains the law in terms of 
^ Gordon, supra note 1, at 110-11. 
65 Id. at 111. 
66 Dray, Some Causal Accounts of the American Civil War, 91 Daedalus 578, 579 (1962). 
Dray states: "[T]he very concept of causation employed by historians is such that no attempt 
at mere 'fairness,' or increase of mere 'information,' would guarantee agreement by investiga­
tors with different standards of value. . . . [T]he concepts of value and of historical causation 
are not logically separable." Id. 
67 Id. at 580-87. 
66 Id. at 587. Dray argues that causal conclusions in history are logically dependent on 
moral values: "As long as 'cause' is not to mean 'sufficient condition,' there must be some 
reason for singling out one relevant condition of what happened from the others. In the cases 
we have examined, at least, the historian's reason appears to derive from moral considera­
tions." Id. 
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those structures reveals the value system implicit in that structure and 
permits it to be evaluated in terms of the (possibly diflFerent) values of 
the person seeking the explanation. Thus, the adequacy of the expla­
nation of law through social structures of thought is justified by a 
redefinition of the goals of legal scholarship. If the goal of explaining 
a legal rule is to enable the one seeking the explanation to make a 
normative judgment about the rule, then the explanation must be in 
terms that reveal the implicit normative structures embodied in the 
rule. Such scholars seek to understand rules in a different way from 
those who simply seek to understand why an individual judge decided 
a case the way she did, or whether she will decide a similar case the 
same way. 
This view of legal scholarship is analogous to the vision of some 
philosophers of history who recognize that the enterprise of history is 
in some sense contradictory: historians seek to provide an account of 
historical events, including the social and political structures of 
thought in which the historical actors understood those events, yet 
must do so in terms of the perspectives, the structures of thought, of 
their own time.^' Yet this same contradiction may also be seen as a 
healthy tension, a means of discovering the differences that make 
judgments, including normative judgments, possible. For example, it 
would be impossible to study the American law of slavery without 
invoking the contemporary historian's own normative perspective;^" 
indeed, that perspective will have much to do with what questions the 
historian chooses to ask and what aspects of the law he chooses to 
study." Yet the historian will be unable to answer those questions if 
he does not attempt and to some degree succeed in his effort to re­
create the social and political structures of thought, including the nor­
mative aspects of thought implicit in those legal rules. For example, 
the ability to understand and make judgments about the law of slav­
ery exists in the tensions or contradictions between those diflFerent 
normative structures.'^ 
While this view of history is surely not "objective" in that it de-
See R. Aron, Introduction to the Philosophy of History 308-09 (G. Irwin trans. 1961). 
All historical descriptions, Aron says, consist of "taking in the whole from a certain point of 
view." Id. at 308. He continues: "As long as the plurality of [historical descriptions] persists 
... the truth of any one of them can be proved only by supra-historical arguments, by the 
values which each one incarnates or the future it announces." Id. at 309. 
'o See Tushnet, A Comment on the Critical Method in Legal History, 6 Cardozo L. Rev. 
101 (1985). (explaining the decisions of antebellum southern judges with reference to their 
underlying social visions, a methodolgy influenced by the author's own structuralist 
jurisprudence). 
R. Cover, Justice Accused 1-7 (1975). 
72 Id. 
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nies the possibility of a universal historical truth, it is far from purely 
relativist in that it assumes an ability to transcend existing structures 
of thought or at least perceive alternative structures. The ability to 
perceive alternative structures is, of course, also a central feature of 
Critical thought; without it the very notion of an explanation in terms 
of underlying structures of thought would be impossible." In much 
the same way that explanations of historical events seek to bridge the 
gap between contemporary and historical conceptual frameworks, 
these explanations of law seek to bridge the gap between the norma­
tive framework of the rule and the normative framework of those 
seeking the explanation. Thus, these explanations can be evaluated 
only by their ability to illuminate, and therefore advance, the 
enterprise. 
73 For example, in the work of Roberto Unger, perception of alternative structures is nw-
essary to Critical thought in two senses: "On the one hand, there are practical and imaginative 
structures that help shape ordinary political and economic activity .... On the other hand, 
however, no higher-level order governs the history of these structures or determines their pos­
sible identities and limits." Unger, supra note 1, at 665. In other words, knowledge of alterna­
tive structures of thought helps us to understand the frozen, limited nature of other past and 
present social organizations, and at the same time helps us to anticipate a truly alternative 
structure emerging from that critical understanding. 
Unger further states: 
[The Critical method] interpret[s] the formative institutional and imaginative con­
texts of social life as frozen politics, traces each of their elements to the particular 
history and measure of constraint upon transformative conflict that the element 
represents. This method must wage perpetual war against the tendency to take the 
workings of a particular social world as if they defined the limits of the real and the 
possible in social life. 
Id. Robert Gordon makes a similar point: "The hope of getting out of that trap and of explor­
ing the alternatives is what fuels the enterprise of criticizing the dominant vision." Gordon, 
supra note 1, at 71. 
